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Abstract. This paper defends the practice of attributing a worldview to a group against the 
objection that this practice overlooks different views within the group and wrongly portrays 
the group as homogeneous. 
 
 A worldview consists of a set of propositions about reality, typically highly general 
propositions. Some classic articles within social and cultural anthropology present the 
worldview of a group.
1
 They present propositions which members of the group are said to 
openly express or else silently assume (e.g. Whorf 1950; Redfield 1952; Horton 1962). An 
example is Robin Horton’s article “The Kalibari Worldview: An Outline and Interpretation.” 
But do anthropologists today attempt to present the worldviews of groups? When I come 
across articles with titles of roughly the form “The worldview of group X,” they are generally 
from decades ago. Of course, this does not mean that the practice of group worldview 
description has disappeared. But this practice seems marginal today, at least within 
anthropology. 
The marginality is because of an objection that has been made against group 
worldview description. Anthropologists mostly do not engage in this practice because they 
think it involves something false. The practice involves portraying all members of a group as 
committing themselves to a certain worldview, when group members typically differ in the 
views they hold. The practice falsely portrays a group as uniform in their views, as 
homogenous. In a review comparing traditional and new approaches to anthropology, Susan 
Wright tells us: 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, we can use “group” in a very broad sense, to refer to any set of individuals. 
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Anthropologists of various persuasions were also criticized for treating 
‘culture’ as if it were a set of ideas and meanings which were shared by a 
whole population of homogeneous individuals – which was empirically not the 
case. (Wright 1998, 8) 
I take this to be the most influential objection that has been offered against group worldview 
description. But should we accept this objection? Below I aim to defend the practice against 
it. 
I shall begin by presenting a response which I think is already grasped by one 
anthropologist, perhaps by more (Strathern 1992, 2). The response involves accepting that the 
people an anthropologist studies may well differ in their views on many topics. But it asserts 
that this is not a problem for the group worldview describer, as long as there are common 
assumptions that the different views rest on. The group worldview describer can then present 
these assumptions and refer to them as a worldview. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following disagreement. Person A thinks that the 
most evil Briton is Jack the Ripper. Person B thinks that the most evil Briton is Margaret 
Thatcher. Despite their different views, there are assumptions that both citizens make, such as 
that some individuals are more evil than others. We can attribute a shared worldview to a 
group, even when different views on a topic are expressed, if there are assumptions common 
to group members. (Can we take any common assumption and say that it is part of a shared 
worldview or must the assumption be of a certain character to qualify? Those who make the 
diversity objection to group worldview description seem to conceive of a diversity of views 
without any common ground of shared views, whatever the character of the views, so the 
point above is a challenge to their conception.) 
I shall now consider the claim that we have empirical evidence against group 
worldview description, in order to make a closely related point. Difference without common 
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ground is an extreme situation. One might wonder whether it is even possible (Davidson 
1974: 19-20). So far I do not think that any anthropologist has presented evidence for such 
“groundless difference” when studying a group. To summarize: the practice of group 
worldview description is objected to as if mere evidence of different views within each group 
studied is enough to reveal the mistakenness of this practice, when what is needed is evidence 
of different views without any common assumptions; and we have yet to be provided with 
evidence of a group which contains such groundless difference. 
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